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Strategic Security in Northern Europe: The Implications of
Russian Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategies in Developing
Complex Threat Environments
Abstract
Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) is a term that came into use to describe an environment in
which an air and air defense force could use a combination of surface-launched ballistic
missiles, surface and air launched cruise missiles and long-range surface-to-air missiles to
prevent an opposing force from accessing or operating within a large airspace effectively.
The descriptions and subsequent analyses of the penetrability of these environments often
rests on assessments of the capabilities of just a few newly developed missiles and may fail
to consider the additional complexity induced by the large array of the entire complement
of air, land and sea launched missiles available to adversaries. This article will focus on
Northern Europe as one example of the higher degrees of complexity that our air forces are
likely to face should the need arise to fight and win in a 21st Century highly contested
environment.
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Introduction
Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) is a term that came into use to describe
an environment in which an air and air defense force could employ an
array of surface and air launched ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and
long-range surface-to-air missiles to prevent an opposing force from
accessing or operating within a large airspace effectively. Possible A2/AD
environments in Europe are typically ascribed to potential Russian
operations in the Baltic Region, Ukraine, or the Black Sea Region. The
descriptions and subsequent analyses of the penetrability of these
environments often rests on Western assessments of the capabilities of
just a few newly developed missiles and may fail to consider the additional
complexity induced by the large array of the entire complement of air, land
and sea launched missiles available to our adversaries. Russian armed
forces field a much wider array of missiles than are generally addressed in
Western discussions of A2/AD and, in most classes of missiles, Russian
systems tend to out range their United States and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) equivalents. This brief assessment will focus on the
compressed geography of Northern Europe as one example of the higher
degrees of complexity NATO air forces are likely to face should the need
arise to fight and win in a 21st Century highly contested environment.

Understanding A2/AD
The Center for Strategic and International Studies provided a good
working definition of A2/AD. It asserted, “A2/AD forces are classified as
those that contribute to denying an adversary’s forces access to a
particular region or otherwise hinder freedom of maneuver.”1 Biddle and
Oelrich expanded the definition to include, “a series of interrelated missile,
sensor, guidance, and other technologies designed to deny freedom of
movement to hostile powers in the air and waters.”2 It is important to note
that A2/AD is not limited to kinetic weapons; Russia could employ
capabilities such as cyber, electro-magnetic pulse and other non-kinetic
weapons to support the establishment of an A2/AD environment.
However, the focus of this article is on the kinetic effects produced by
multiple, overlapping missile systems.
Geography matters in any kinetic combat and the physical constraints
imposed by the battlespace will shape the manner in which A2/AD is
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implemented in a given operational context. In order to be successful, an
A2/AD construct must be able to establish a protected operational
maneuver space for its own forces while being able to conduct offensive
operations against an opponent outside of its own protected operational
maneuver space. Such an A2/AD capability is enhanced to the extent that
the A2/AD power can hold the opposing power at risk while retaining
relative sanctuary for its own forces. One way to do this is by building and
operating offensive and defensive missile systems that out-range those of
the opponent. In addition, this, as will be described in detail, is precisely
what the Russians have done.
Most western descriptions of a potential Russian A2/AD environment in
Northern Europe rest on the capabilities of three Russian missile systems:
The Iskander M mobile theater ballistic missile (TBM), often operating in
a mixed battery with the Iskander K cruise missile (CM); the Oniks
supersonic cruise missile can be launched from shipboard or land-based
launchers; and the S-400 Triumf long range surface-to-air missile (SAM)
system.35 The Iskander, Oniks and Triumf taken together are quite
formidable but, as will be discussed later in this article, there is much
more at work here than these three systems, both in terms of offensive and
defensive capabilities. It is the overlapping capabilities of these systems,
compounded by their range advantages vis-s-vis their NATO counterparts,
that renders the A2/AD environment in Northern Europe to be
particularly challenging for NATO.
For the western military planner, the essential questions are
straightforward: Does Russian A2/AD capability offer early strategic
advantages in a large force-on-force conflict. If so, does Russia have the
capacity to exploit those advantages? Finally, have western military
planners properly characterized the Russian A2/AD threat?
In order answer those questions and to understand the overlapping and
mutually supporting threats posed by these systems, it is necessary to
undertake a brief excursion to describe their capabilities and to discuss
how these three systems complement each other. Taken in context, it is
necessary to discuss both the three large primary systems as well as other
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complementary systems that add complexity and lethality to the
battlespace.

The Big Three: Iskander, Onyx, and Triumf
The Iskander system is deployed as a brigade level system. An Iskander
brigade and employs both TBM and cruise missile variants. Published
maximum ranges for the Iskander M TBM vary from 400-500 km.3 At
least one Iskander TBM was launched to a distance of 480 km on the
Kapustin Yar missile range during Zapad 2017.4 This compares to only
300 km for the United States counterpart system, the AGM-140 Army
Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).5Assuming the published ranges are
correct, the Iskander would be able to engage the ATACMS while
remaining out of ATACMS range. The Iskander K cruise missile has a
published range of 500 km. The United States had expressed concerns that
its actual range is longer and in violation of the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty’s 500 km range limit on cruise missiles.6 On
August 2, 2020, the United States announced its intention to withdraw
from the INF Treaty for that reason.7 The United States has subsequently
withdrawn from the INF treaty.
The Iskander TBM poses particularly difficult technical challenges for the
NATO defender. The Iskander M employs a quasi-ballistic profile
beginning with a vertical launch into a flattened ballistic trajectory with
the rocket booster. After engine burnout, the missile begins to pitch over
and continues to climb to high altitude while maintaining hypersonic
cruise.8 Hard evasive maneuvering (20-30 G) during the re-entry phase
complicates NATO missile defense.9 If these evasive maneuvers begin
outside of the maximum effective range NATO defensive systems,
intercept of the Iskander M missile becomes extremely difficult. Further
complicating the problem of countering the Iskander is the high mobility
and off-road capability of the mobile launchers. One would anticipate that
the missile launch vehicles would remain radio silent and would be
camouflaged prior to launch. Following launch, the mobile launchers
would likely displace quickly in order to reload and move to a new launch
location.
Five Iskander Brigades have been deployed in Russia’s Western Military
District since 2010, with one brigade west of St Petersburg; it can range
much of the Baltic region from its garrison location10. Iskander missile
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systems have been deployed intermittently in the Kaliningrad enclave in
recent years; it appears that a system will now be stationed in the
Kaliningrad enclave on a permanent basis.11
The Onyx is a ramjet powered system and is intended for use against naval
and land-based targets. In addition to its shipboard and air launched
versions, the same missile is also used in Bastion-P land-based launchers.
Onyx systems have been deployed to the Kaliningrad enclave at least since
2016, with a range of up to 600 km and a flight envelope ranging from just
above sea level up to 14,000 m; following booster burnout, the ramjet
continues to accelerate to a maximum speed of Mach 2.5 which the missile
sustains until impact.12 The Onyx can range most of the Baltic region,
making it an effective system for use against both ships and land targets.13
As with the Iskander and Oynx, the S-400 Triumf SAM system, with a
maximum effective range of 400 km, can out range its United States
equivalent, the Patriot PAC 2, which has a published maximum range of
160km.14 Whereas the US Patriot employs a single missile type to engage
targets across its defended area, the Triumf employs four different missiles
(hence the designation S-400) to cover various range, altitude and
engagement conditions (an S-500 with a 500 km range is reportedly in
development). Alternatively, the US Theater High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) with a 200 km+ range against TBMs15 does offer significant
range advantages over the S-400 system in an anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
role. In that mode the S-400 is limited to an effective range of 60 km
against TBMs16. A number of NATO countries employ the NATO Surfaceto-Air Missile System (NASAMS) mobile air defense system; however, its
55–180 km engagement envelope is well short of range needed to defend
against longer-range offensive missiles.17
Given the effective ranges of the various S-400 missiles, the S-400 system
would be capable of defending the Russian battlespace while remaining
out of range of NATO’s offensive missiles. At the same time, the S-400
would retain a capability to hold at risk United States and NATO Battle
Management, Surveillance and Reconnaissance aircraft such as the E-3
AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), E-8 JSTARS (Joint
Surveillance and Radar Attack System) plus the high-altitude U-2 and RQ4 aircraft. The extended range of the S-400 system would potentially force
these aircraft to retrograde for survivability, significantly diminishing their
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ability to monitor and respond to Russian military movements across the
border. Drones could partially compensate by way of penetrating hostile
airspace, but would still be vulnerable to Russian air defense systems.
Taken together, these conditions would reduce the depth of NATO
airborne sensor coverage of the battlespace and would degrade NATO’s
capacity to monitor Russian forces in Russian territory.

And All the Rest….
The Iskander, Triumf, and Onyx are formidable systems but there are
more. While there are shorter-range tactical systems, they contribute less
to the A2/AD environment than do the longer-range systems. The focus of
the remainder of this discussion will address the rest of the air-launched
systems that add additional complexity to the A2/AD environment. For
purposes of this discussion, these missiles can be broken down into three
categories: Anti-radiation missiles, air-to-air missiles, and air-to-surface
missiles. These Russian systems can be launched from outside of NATO air
space, generally from outside the range of NATO’s offensive and defensive
missiles, and could be employed in coordination with previously described
land based offensive and defensive missile systems in a campaign to
achieve local air superiority.
Anti-Radiation Missiles
The Russian Air Force operates a number of anti-radiation missiles,
including some short-range tactical systems; in the context of this paper,
the longer-range systems are more relevant since, as with the systems
previously discussed, they can be launched from aircraft remaining in
Russian airspace in many cases. The KH-58 has been produced in several
variants, but the KH-58U has extended range (250 km) when launched
from high altitude, as well as the capability to acquire and lock onto the
targeted radar after launch.18 One KH-58 variant is designed to counter
both the Hawk and the Patriot SAM systems.19
Air-to-Surface Missiles
The Russian Air Force fields a broad array of conventional air-to-surface
ballistic and cruise missiles. For purposes of this discussion, however, the
long-range missiles are the systems of interest, at least for the opening
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phase of an air campaign against NATO. This points to two missiles—the
Kh-555 and the Kh-101—both of which are predominantly bomber
launched. These cruise missiles are not stealthy per se, but do have
relatively small radar cross sections, 400 kg warheads, and extended
ranges of 3500 km for the Kh-555 and up to 5500 km for the Kh-101. Both
the TU-95 and TU-160 heavy bombers are capable of carrying these
missiles. 20 21
The most recent addition to the Russian Air Force arsenal is the Kh-47M2
Kinzhal, an air-launched hypersonic missile, capable of carrying either a
nuclear or conventional 480kg warhead.22 The Kinzhal appears to have
been developed from the ground launched Iskander M missile. The
Kinzhal is classified as an air-launched ballistic missile, and is carried by a
modified MiG-31 fighter aircraft. Reportedly, at least eight MIG-31
aircraft have been modified to carry the missile, which has an advertised
range of 1500-2000 km. The Kinzhal appears to have been developed to
target key NATO airfields, command centers, and theater missile defenses
with attacks from multiple axes.23
Air-to-Air Missiles
As with the air-to-surface missiles, the Russian Air Force has a number of
short range and medium range air-to-air missiles, but when considering
the air-to-air missile contribution to establishing and maintaining an
A2/AD environment, the long-range missiles count. The R-37M is the
missile of interest with a potential range of 400 km. The R-37 reportedly
employs semi-active guidance through midcourse switching to active radar
homing at end game. The R-37 was designed specifically to attack NATO’s
large battle management and reconnaissance aircraft such as the E-3
AWACS, E-8 JSTARS, and RC-135 Rivet Joint24. Potentially, it could also
be employed against highflying reconnaissance aircraft such as the US RQ4 and the U-2.

Understanding A2/AD as an integrated counter-air campaign
The purpose of an A2/AD environment is to deny the opposing force
access to one’s own battlespace while also limiting the opponent’s freedom
of action in his own battlespace. To support this objective, Russia has
developed a wide array of missile capabilities offering a range of
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capabilities, flight profiles, and destructive effects. While individually
defeating or pre-empting any one of these threats is feasible, the potential
for Russian aerospace forces to introduce complexity, time compression,
and simultaneity of multiple missile systems that poses the greatest threat.
These missile systems are collectively capable of employment in multiple
speed and altitude regimes, with a wide variety of flight profiles, delivering
a wide range of effects. Presumably, Russian Air Forces would integrate
cyber effects with the planned kinetic effects.
An A2/AD threat environment comprising the full range of Russian
missile capabilities would present formidable challenges for NATO forces.
The Russian A2/AD threat does not depend on any one advanced missile
system, but results instead from the over-lapping and mutually supporting
effects of multiple advanced missile systems operating offensively and
defensively in the same battlespace. In addition, as noted above, the
inclusion of multiple air and surface launched complementary systems
adds to the complexity and simultaneity of the modern battlespace. The
forces to accomplish this are largely in place today in northern Europe.
A Russian missile-based air campaign against NATO, based on the
capabilities and range advantages described in the foregoing discussion,
would likely incorporate the following features:
•

Iskander-M TBM batteries would be capable of launching preemptive strikes against key NATO command and control systems
and bases. These first strikes would be followed by immediate
launcher displacement to alternate firing sites to reload and fire a
second strike.

•

Iskander-K and P-800 Onyx systems could launch cruise missiles
from multiple locations, on multiple axes of attack, against key
forward areas, with sufficient separation to avoid fratricide while
retaining the simultaneity needed to complicate the defenses.

•

Russian medium and heavy bombers, operating well outside of
NATO radar detection range, could launch cruise missiles on
multiple axes, for low altitude penetration with times-over-target
synchronized with the Iskander strikes. Concurrently, selected
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bombers could launch Kinzhal hypersonic missiles on lofted
trajectories against high value targets.
•

Selected Russian fighter aircraft, operating in Russian air space,
could launch Kinzhal long-range hypersonic missiles against key
NATO targets.

•

Russian aircraft could launch anti-radiation missiles from multiple
platforms on high altitude profiles with near vertical dive angles in
the terminal phase to target key NATO radar systems.

•

Russian fighter aircraft could launch long-range air-to-air missiles
against NATO battle management, surveillance, and reconnaissance
aircraft in coordination with attacks by S-400 long-range surfaceto-air missiles, again employing multiple attack axes with varying
profiles and ranges.

Although Russian military doctrine does not formally include preemption, there appears to be great concern among Russian military
strategists about the need to engage forcefully and early in any conflict
with NATO. Hence, any pre-emption would be characterized as defensive
in nature and the Russian military has exercised pre-emption in multiple
military exercises.25 Moreover, Russian military thought are increasingly
focused on the potential need for pre-emption and the need for early
decisive air operations at the outset of any conflict with the intent of
“destroying Western equipment before it can even get airborne.”26

Strategic Implications
NATO relies on integrated air and ground-based missile systems to defend
against hostile missiles and aircraft. These defenses include both fighter
aircraft and various anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems. Installation of
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) SM-3 missile sites in
Romania and Poland, although planned for defense against ballistic
missile launches from the Middle East, could contribute to defense against
other missile threats as well.27 However, with that notable exception, the
remainder of NATO’s in place air defense and missile defense systems are
largely short-range systems. These include the United States built
PATRIOT system. While the Patriot has a maximum range of about 70 km
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against aircraft, its maximum effective range against ballistic missiles is
limited to about 15-22 km, depending on target and intercept geometry.28
The SAMP/T Air Defense System, jointly developed by France and Italy,
features intercept ranges of 30-120 km, depending on the interceptor
missile used.29 Area defense could be provided by the THAAD system,
which has a range of approximately 200 km and is designed for
employment against short, medium, and intermediate range ballistic
missiles.30 However, the THAAD system is not permanently stationed in
Europe and would have to be deployed to support a NATO contingency.
Taken together, the simple fact is that in most cases, Russian missiles
outrange and, in some cases outnumber the NATO counterpart systems.
Russia can employ these systems at the outset of a NATO conflict in a way
that achieves early strategic advantages. Moreover, the Russians are
continuing to develop newer systems as well, while paying particular
attention to development of hypersonic missiles. As stated at the
beginning of this article, with some notable exceptions, few of the Russian
missile systems described in this article are truly new and virtually all of
them can be defeated when addressed individually. However aggregated,
they present an impressive array of capabilities that can establish a
complex and formidable aerospace threat environment.
While newer, longer-range systems are in development for the United
States and NATO missile arsenal, it is not clear that these efforts will be
sufficient to close the capability gap. The Russians, after all, are continuing
to modernize as well. The US Army’s long-range precision fires programs
include development of several longer-range systems. The Precision Strike
Missile, with a range of 700-800 km will eventually replace the ATACMS.
A Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon with a range described only as
thousands of kilometers is also in development.31 The US Air Force plans
to begin deploying the long-range AIM-260 to replace the current AIM120 air-to-air missile.32 The AIM-260 is expected to reach initial operating
capability by 2022.33
Russian ground forces in the Western Military District and in the
Kaliningrad enclave have been reorganized and repositioned in recent
years. In addition, Russian engineers have improved transportation
infrastructure opposite the Baltic Region to permit quick border crossings
of Russian Army forces into the Baltic States34. Such preparations
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potentially place Russian forces in a position to move rapidly into
Northern Europe, through the Baltic States or beyond, under the
protection of an A2/AD complex that is multi-layered, robust, and
generally outranges NATO counterpart systems. This A2/AD complex
would be able to hold NATO resources at risk across northern Europe,
push airborne surveillance, reconnaissance and battle management
aircraft back for survivability, and conduct precision missile attacks on key
NATO airbases and other high value resources while Russian ground
forces invested NATO territory under a formidable air defense system.
Deterring and/or countering such a threat may require more military
capacity than NATO’s air forces can provide and planners should assume
that any conflict between Russia and NATO would be an all-domain
undertaking. The fact that this article focuses on the air components of
that battle should, therefore, not be misconstrued to infer that other
military components would not be involved.

Discussion
This article posed three questions. With the important caveat that
certainty only occurs after the fact, one can draw some conclusions based
on the information available. Each question is addressed in turn.
Does Russian A2/AD capability offer early strategic advantages in a large
force-on-force conflict? The evidence certainly suggests that Russia has
potential military advantages in the early stages of a conflict in Europe,
assuming Russia initiates the conflict. Based on the missile capabilities
discussed in this article, Russia enjoys range advantages in multiple
categories of air and surface launched missiles and these range advantages
accord Russia the potential to strike first while remaining out of the range
of the NATO counter-part systems. Moreover, there is evidence that, while
Russian military doctrine does not promote first strike or pre-emption,
Russian strategists are, contemplating such changes in doctrine,
nonetheless. For example, two associate professors from the Russian pilot
training academy recently published an article advocating first strike as an
option, arguing that “the combined use of drones, missiles, cyber warfare,
and new weaponry” could destroy NATO aircraft on the ground.35
Presumably, any such Russian air attack would not be limited to
destroying NATO aircraft and airbases, but would include attacks on
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radars, command and control, plus offensive and defensive missiles as
well.
If so, does Russia have the capacity to exploit those advantages? Russia
has sufficient forces to sustain air combat operations in northern Europe
for some period. This article does not address the sustainability of such a
campaign, but clearly, Russia has the capacity to conduct large-scale air
and missile attacks at the outset in support of land attacks across Northern
Europe. Russian offensive missile attacks against NATO targets could be
exploited by penetrating manned aircraft—fighters and bombers—to strike
key NATO military formations, installations, command and control, and
lines of communication.
Finally, have western military planners properly characterized the Russian
A2/AD threat? It is not clear that western military planners have properly
characterized the A2/AD threat. This is mainly so because the assessments
of that threat focused on the introduction of the three newer systems
discussed earlier in this article—the Iskander TBM, Triumf SAM system
and the Oynx cruise missiles. Missing from many assessments are two key
factors that are likely to affect the outcome of a large, multi-domain
conflict in northern Europe. The first of these factors, and the point of this
article, is that the Russian missile threat is larger and far more complex
than is typically characterized in the open-source literature. Complexity
creates additional risk and carries with it the potential to overwhelm local
defenses. As has been discussed throughout this article, the range
advantages enjoyed by most Russian missiles over their NATO
counterparts create tactical and strategic advantages at the outset of any
conflict. Further, in going beyond Iskander, Triumf, and Onyx, the
integration of large numbers of other offensive and defensive Russian
missiles in the air battle introduces degrees of complexity that will
challenge NATO air and air defense forces.

Conclusion
The purpose of a Russian A2/AD environment would be to achieve
military superiority at the operational level of war and, in so doing, to
achieve strategic effects by denying NATO air, ground and sea access in
specific regions under the umbrella of highly lethal offensive and defensive
missiles and launch systems. The establishment of the A2/AD
88
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environment would thus have the capacity to enable Russian freedom of
action under the protection of the A2/AD umbrella. Obviously, such an
A2/AD umbrella would be contested by NATO air and missile forces, but
as discussed in this article, Russia has the capacity to impose a much more
complex A2/AD environment in a given operational theater of war than is
generally described by most Western descriptions of these weapon
systems.
Developing an effective response to Russian A2/AD requires a more
comprehensive examination of the complex threats posed by multiple
overlapping Russian systems and the evolution of improved tactics,
techniques, and procedures to deal with them. NATO should develop
decision criteria well in advance with respect to when, and whether, to
allow large (and vulnerable) ISR and battle management aircraft to
retrograde for survivability prior to any outbreak of hostilities. Planners
should give priority to continuous intelligence preparation of the
battlespace, before the outbreak of hostilities, to identify and monitor
mobile missile locations and movements to facilitate identification of
potential deployment sites for Iskander TBM mobile launchers. Tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP) must be developed and maintained for
the employment of fifth generation fighters and low observable
reconnaissance aircraft to penetrate hostile airspace and track, identify,
and defeat mobile missiles early in the fight. Engagement of the offensive
and defensive missile threats must include both kinetic and non-kinetic
means.
None of the foregoing discussion is intended to suggest that development
of new weapon systems and capabilities is not underway. The US Air Force
is already reportedly working on development of a sixth generation fighter
aircraft under its Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program.
Hypersonic missiles are under development as well in both the Army and
the Air Force. Initial work is underway to develop disaggregated command
and control systems, which should reduce single points of failure.
However, all of these capabilities lie in the future and will be of little use
should hostilities erupt in the near term. In addition, of course, Russian air
and military forces are developing new systems as well.
However, the simple fact of the matter is that if Russia goes to war against
NATO tomorrow, NATO must go with the Air Forces it has. In addition, as
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outlined in this article, that fact renders the reassessment of NATO
responses to expanded Russian A2/AD capacities all the more urgent.
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